On the Application of Ammori   v
Secretary of State for the Home Department

Nick King returned to the Royal Courts of Justice

25 September 2025

Photo: Banksy

While political leaders had been amplifying the ramifications of recognition of a Palestinian state earlier this week, the business of the appropriate forum to decide Palestine Action's proscription was being revisited in London.

The Secretary of State had lodged an appeal - having surmounted Justice Chamberlain's prior refusal - to contest permission for judicial review granted to Huda Ammori by the High Court on 30 July 2025. On 21 August, the written judgment of Lord Justice Underhill was cited as acknowledging the "force in [Justice Chamberlain's] reasoning", while considering "that the appeal has a real prospect of success".

Having succeeded Yvette Cooper as Home Secretary on September 5, Shabana Mahmood decided not to intervene in the course of proceedings, notwithstanding the growing popular protests surrounding the proscription of Palestine Action. The matter thus returned to the Royal Courts of Justice on 25 September 2025 for the appeal on the part of the King regarding the application of Ammori v Secretary of State for the Home Department.

Exceptional Qualification

The case for the Home Secretary, presented once again by Sir James Eadie KC, contained little new material beyond that which was heard by Justice Chamberlain on 21 July 2025. Eadie stated that there was no quibble with Chamberlain's evaluation of the relevant factors supporting his conclusions, but took issue with his derivation of conclusion from them: it was not a matter of their comparative weight, but the overriding principle that judicial review requires something 'exceptional' to diverge from statutory direction. As the centripetal pivot of the Home Secretary's position, this argument reiterated that award of judicial review ought not to depart from the statutory procedures laid down by Parliament on establishment of the legislation (citing a seminal authority, Kurdistan Workers' Party v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002]).

However, that source (KWP) had been re-examined in the particular and contemporary context of Palestine Action at the preceding judgment of 30 July 2025. The Government's case did not appear convincingly to challenge the three matters which were there found askew ([63-67]: temporal displacement; closed material; equitable remedy), except to return again in principle to the protection of the Secretary of State's discretion as accorded by statute. It had been asserted in KWP, moreover, that there was no 'ouster' provision in the statute, as with certain other legislated instruments, that articulated Parliament's intention to prevent judicial review; that it was "common ground" that permission fell within the discretionary remit of the courts [71]; and that consideration of the context and particular subject-matter of a claim should override approaches relying on general principle [74].

Interventions from the bench turned to substantive corollaries: Lewis LJ brought forward the fact that the issue regarding Palestine Action was one of proscription, not deproscription, making immediate application of POAC (Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission) provisions inappropriate. Indeed, the statutory provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000 alone would render it impossible to challenge directly and in the instance the contextual validity of a proscription order [KWP 81]. Edis LJ observed that scope must exist for resort to judicial review and highlighted further that Parliament could also, via the statutory affirmative resolution procedure, frustrate the remedy of a POAC deproscription judgment.

Presumptive Adequacy

For the Respondents, Raza Husain KC rebutted the substance of the Appellant's presentation per the permissions hearing, challenging the argued adequacy of POAC's alternative remedy as a channel for convenient and effective redress in the case of Palestine Action. Further, institutionally the courts, not Parliament, possess expertise in the rule of law, while constitutionally the courts, and not Parliament, are the arbiter of decisions regarding judicial review.

Proscription had confused civil disobedience with terrorism - it was the first time that non-violent direct action had been depicted in this way. General public reaction to the measure had shown that there was significant public interest in the issue and that it was not a typical case for which the statute could be said to have been drawn up. POAC is unable, by construction, to compensate retroactively for the potential detriment suffered by those whose rights will be impacted under sections of the Terrorism Acts that thenceforward would apply to otherwise peaceful activity.

Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh KC presented to the Court that the Home Secretary's proscribing order had manifested a distinct prejudicial effect discriminating against Palestinian communities, and that this had been taken into account neither in its introduction nor exercise. In granting leave to pursue judicial review, Justice Chamberlain was obliged to acknowledge how the order's enforcement in actuality could entrap individuals without recourse to eventual remedial acquittal.

Action Off

By the end of the afternoon session, to whatever Underhill LJ's "real prospect of success" was attached remained unclear, unless perhaps to closed material intimated at the outset of the day's proceedings. A special-advocates' memorandum referencing such had been forwarded in advance to the appeal Justices, which they unanimously considered did not merit reclusion from public disclosure. Having been asked, yet failing, to provide further substantiation concerning that request before the mid-day recess, the Appellants were offered a prolongation to comply.

The Respondents had intended a cross-application appealing dismissal of the several grounds 1,5,6 & 7 during the permissions hearing. Procedural rules required, however, the application having to be made within seven days of judgment, which had not occurred. A submission for a deferred deadline to appeal would therefore need to be considered. The Lady Chief Justice, Lady Carr of Walton-on-the-Hill, granted extra time for written submissions on both the closed material and extension for application to be supplied by 29 September 2025. Judgment was reserved.

What Happened Next: Addendum, 18 October 2025

The Lady Chief Justice handed down judgment from the hearing on 17 October 2025:

-  The Secretary of State's re-submitted contention that an appeal to POAC constituted an adequate alternative remedy to expeditious judicial review did not succeed. The mechanism of application to POAC had not been constructed by Parliament to challenge the exercise of the statutory power to proscribe an organisation, but to pursue an appeal for deproscription. It could not remedy the wider public consequences occurring from an organisation's erroneous proscription.

-  Of the dismissal of four grounds against which Ammori sought to cross-appeal, a temporal extension was accommodated and permission to proceed to judicial review granted for two, namely the cited grounds 5 (relevant considerations) and 6 (consistency in policy). There exist with these submissions domestic public law principles that are distinct from assessment as to whether the proscribing Order amounted to a disproportionate interference with Article 9 or 10 rights under the European Convention of Human Rights. The petitions for grounds 1 (improper purpose) and 7 (due consideration for protected characteristics) were unsuccessful.

With minor subsequent amendments, the Special Advocates' memorandum seeking closed material was disclosed in open proceedings. The date for the judicial review was arranged for three days beginning 25 November 2025.